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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
S 78-2-2(3)(j) Utah Code Ann, (Supp. 1968).
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether Pioneer Valley Hospital is a proper party to

this appeal.
2.

Whether a party on appeal may assign as error either

giving or failure to give an instruction without first stating an
exception to said instruction with enough specificity to give
trial court notice of any alleged error.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may be determinative of the issues presented in this appeal.
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier
time as the court reasonably directs, any party may
file written requests that the court instruct the jury
on the law as set forth in said requests. The court
shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the
requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such
instructions may be given orally or otherwise waive
this requirement. If the instructions are to be given
in writing, all objections thereto must be made before
the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise,
objections may be made to the instructions after they
are given to the jury, but before the jury retires to
consider its verdict. No party may assign as error the
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he
objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an
instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter
to which he objects and the grounds for his objection.
Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and in the interests of
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justice, may review the giving of or failure to give an
instruction. Opportunity shall be given to make objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing of the
jury.
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made
after the court has instructed the jury. The court
shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if
the court states any of the evidence, it must instruct
the jurors that they are the exclusive judges of all
questions of fact.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Complaint, filed in October, 1986, alleged claims
against the defendant hospital and anesthesiologist, sounding in
ordinary negligence and malpractice, res ipsa loquitur, and
failure to obtain informed consent.

On February 17, 1988,

defendants brought a motion for summary judgment on the ground
that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of establishing by
competent medical expert testimony that the defendants breached
the duty of reasonable care owed to her.

On April 4, 1988, the

trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and
plaintiff appealed.
On September 16, 1988, this Court granted plaintiff's motion
for summary disposition, stating:

"The trial court was mani-

festly in error in granting summary judgment since material facts
are in dispute."

Further, the office of the clerk of the Supreme

Court for the State of Utah referred to Nixdorf v. Hicken, as
"controlling on the issue of res ipsa loquitur.

Expert evidence

is not necessary to establish the applicable standard of care in
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this case as it appears no medical technicalities are involved."
The court's ruling on plaintiff's motion for summary disposition
is attached as Appendix A.
The case was tried to a jury from April 17 through the 19th,
1989, the Honorable J. Homer Wilkinson residing.

Throughout the

entire course of the trial, counsel for plaintiff and counsel for
the defendants explained to the jury the two alternative theories
of recovery to which plaintiff may be entitled.

The first was a

theory of ordinary negligence and to meet her burden of proof,
plaintiff was required to show that the health care provided was
substandard.

The second theory of recovery was res ipsa loquitur

and counsel for all parties explained that no expert testimony
was needed for recovery on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur if
the jury was convinced that the foundational requirements of the
doctrine had been met by the plaintiff.

The jury was properly

instructed on the two alternative theories of recovery.
During the trial, plaintiff failed to object to expert
evidence presented by defendant Dr. Dickson.

Further, she failed

to make a clear record of any objections to proposed jury
instructions, making only a surreptitious record of exceptions
out of the ear shot of the court and the defendants.

For these

reasons, plaintiff's motion for a new trial was denied.
Plaintiff now appeals on the ground that two of the given
jury instructions, which admittedly correctly reflect the law,
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referred to ordinary negligence and would be inapplicable should
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Based on the Supreme Court's ruling on plaintiff's motion
for summary disposition, and based on the fact that the
Complaint, which was never amended, addressed alternative
theories of recovery, both theories were presented to the jury.
Plaintiff failed to object to the introduction of expert
testimony from Dr. Reichmann stating the requisite standard of
care was met by the anesthesiologist, defendant Dickson.
In addition, plaintiff failed to object to the instructions
proposed by defendant Dickson regarding ordinary negligence.

In

fact, as late as closing argument, plaintiff commented on
Dr. Reichmann and the opinions he presented, and explained to the
jury that Dr. Reichmann's testimony was presented as "a defense
to our theory of ordinary negligence."

(Transcript, p. 499.)

Thus, without voicing any objections to the proposed jury
instructions and without objecting to the introduction of expert
testimony regarding standard of care, plaintiff's counsel began
his closing argument as follows:
Good morning ladies and gentlemen. As the judge
indicated, this is my opportunity to argue this case to
you and let you know what I think the evidence indicated. You have been sitting here now for two days
listening, as I have, to the various witnesses testify,
examining the exhibits. And you have heard my opening
argument [sic] what I thought the evidence was going to
show and what I thought it would mean. And I am now
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going to now tell you why I think I kept that bargain
with you and have made those showings.
To begin with, I would like to set forth once
again the theories of law that my client is going under
against these defendants. It's important because they
are a little bit separate. And if you agree with one
theory, then some of the Judge's Instructions may not
apply to the other theory.
The first theory is the ordinary negligence theory
against Dr. Dickson. This is the kind of theory that
you use if someone injures you and you file a lawsuit. . . . that's one of our theories. It is just a
straight on malpractice cause of action against Dr.
Dickson only.
Now, our other theory is the theory that the Judge
referred to as the res ipsa loquitur theory. This is
against Pioneer Valley Hospital and Dr. Dickson. Now,
this theory is different than the first one because it
is a situation where we don't know what caused the
injury. It is a situation where the events that
occurred were under the control of someone else at a
time when Mrs. Nielsen was out.
(Transcript at pp. 477-479.)
Plaintiff actually commented specifically on Jury
Instruction 19; her counsel argued:
So the Judge read you some Jury Instructions in which
he stated that you are not permitted to use your own
standard and your own experience with physicians in
determining negligence. That is true for the common,
for the ordinary negligence theory that we are going
under, that the doctor was just ordinarily negligence
as a doctor. You can't use your own experience because
you are not a doctor, but you can use your own experience under the theory of res ipsa loquitur. And I
suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that your
experience and my experience is that when you go into a
hospital for a knee operation, you should not come out
into the recovery room with your teeth broken out. It
is just something that shouldn't happen.
(Transcript at p. 480.)
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Thus, the jury was instructed on two alternative theories,
and counsel explained the application of each theory to the jury.
By way of special verdict, the jury found unanimously that
plaintiff had failed to prove negligence on the part of
Dr. Dickson and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not
apply to Pioneer Valley Hospital or to Dr. Dickson.

The jury

never reached the issue of damages.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
PIONEER VALLEY HOSPITAL IS NOT A PROPER PARTY
TO THIS APPEAL.
A.

Plaintiff proceeded against defendant Pioneer Valley
Hospital on a theory of res ipsa loquitur; no expert
testimony was presented by either side regarding ordinary
negligence.

B.

The allegedly prejudicial instructions dealt only with
defendant Dr. Dickson and had nothing to do with defendant
Pioneer Valley Hospital.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF MAY NOT ASSIGN AS ERROR THE GIVING
OR THE FAILURE TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION SINCE
SHE MADE NO TIMELY OBJECTION.

A.

Throughout the course of the trial, plaintiff proceeded on
alterative theories of recovery.

B.

Objections must be sufficiently specific to give the trial
court notice of claimed error.

C.

As late as closing argument, plaintiff argued two alternative theories of recovery.
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POINT III
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
JURY'S FINDING OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION.
ARGUMENT
I.

PIONEER VALLEY HOSPITAL IS NOT A PROPER PARTY TO THIS

APPEAL.
None of the issues or arguments raised by plaintiff on this
appeal apply to Pioneer Valley Hospital.

First, no expert

testimony was presented by either plaintiff or defendant Pioneer
Valley Hospital regarding the requisite standard of care.
Second, the allegedly erroneous jury instructions were
proposed by defendant Dr. Dickson and had nothing at all to do
with Pioneer Valley Hospital.

Specifically, Instruction No. 16

dealt with the duty of care a physician owes a patient.
Similarly, Instruction No. 19 described the standards applicable
to physicians in their treatment of patients.
Furthermore, the instructions proposed by defendant Pioneer
Valley Hospital received no objections by either defendant Dr.
Dickson or plaintiff and no exceptions were taken.

These

instructions accurately reflect the claims as alleged against the
hospital.
For example, Instruction No. 17 emphasizes that it is
undisputed in this case that the physician defendant is an
independent contractor and that Pioneer Valley Hospital is not

-7-

responsible for the negligent acts, if any, of such independent
contractor.
Instruction No, 18 describes the duty of a hospital towards
a person as that of reasonable care.
Instruction No. 18.

There was no objection to

Similarly, Instruction No. 20 stated:

If you believe from the evidence that the things
of which the plaintiff complains were caused or were
occasioned by or from any cause or causes over which
the defendant, Pioneer Valley Hospital, had no control,
while for which it is not responsible, you must find
that the hospital did not cause or contribute to the
damage suffered by the plaintiff. If you believe that
it cannot be determined with reasonable certainty
whether the damage complained of by the plaintiff was
caused by any act or failure to act on the part of the
defendant hospital and its employees, whereby anything
over which it had control, you must also find in favor
of the defendant hospital.
Again, plaintiff took no exception to Instruction No. 20.
Instruction No. 21 instructed the jury on "unavoidable
accidents."

An unavoidable accident is defined as one which

occurs in such a manner that it cannot justly be said to have
been proximately caused by negligence as those terms are defined
by other instructions.

"In the event a party is damaged by an

unavoidable accident, he has no right to recovery, since the law
requires that a person be injured by the fault or negligence of
another as a prerequisite to any right to recover damages."
Again, no exception was taken to

Id.

Instruction No. 21.

Finally, Instruction No. 22 instructed the jury on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

The jury was instructed that in

certain situations it is not necessary for the plaintiff in a
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medical malpractice action to present evidence of the defendants'
negligence by expert testimony.

Specifically, where the propri-

ety of the treatment received is within the common knowledge and
experience of the layman, expert testimony is unnecessary to
establish the standard of care owed to the plaintiff.

The court

instructed the jury that a plaintiff must, however, establish by
the evidence that:

(1) the accident was of a kind which, in the

ordinary course of events, would not have happened had the
defendant(s) used due care; (2) the instrument or thing causing
the injury was at the time of the accident under the management
and control of the defendant(s); and (3) the accident happened
irrespective of any participation at the time by the plaintiff.
The jury was instructed that if they found by a preponderance of
the evidence that all three of the above criteria have been met
then they could infer negligence from those circumstances.

Based

on the unanimous verdict of no cause of action, the jury apparently failed to be convinced by a preponderance of the evidence
that the three foundational requirements for the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur had been met.

The evidence is sufficient to

support to the verdict; appellant has failed to marshal any
evidence to the contrary.
are attached as Appendix

(The jury instructions as referenced

ff

B.,f)
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II-

PLAINTIFF MAY NOT ASSIGN AS ERROR THE GIVING OR THE

FAILURE TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION SINCE SHE MADE NO TIMELY
OBJECTION.
Appellant voiced no objections in the trial court to the
correctness or completeness of the instructions that were
actually given to the jury.

Further, the issues raised on appeal

were not adequately raised in appellant's general exceptions on
the record to the trial court's decision to give defendant
Dickson's proposed Instructions 16 and 19.

Specifically, plain-

tiff failed to call to the attention of either the defendants or
the court that said instructions were inconsistent or problematic.

Rather, plaintiff's counsel made a private record to the

court reporter well after ostensibly agreeing to the proposed
instructions.
Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 51, a party may not
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction
unless he objects thereto, and the objection must be sufficiently
specific to give the trial court notice of the claimed error.
E.A. Strout W. Reality v. W.C. Fov & Sons, 665 P.2d 1320, 1322,
(Utah 1983).
The specificity requirement insures that the trial court
will understand the basis of the objections and have a fair
opportunity to correct any errors before the case goes to the
jury.

Hansen v. Steward, 761 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 1988) (citing

King v. Feredav, 739 P.2d 612, 620-21 (Utah 1987)).
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A party who

fails to comply with this requirement is generally precluded from
raising on appeal an issue based on a specific objection to jury
instructions that was not presented first to the trial court.
See, id.
Admittedly, Rule 51 does permit the appellate court to
address such issues even though they were not properly preserved
below, but appellant must present persuasive reasons why the
court should exercise such discretion.

E.A. Strout W. Reality,

665 P.2d at 1322, which requires "showing special circumstances
warranty such a review."

Candelt Intn'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745

P.2d 1239, 1241 (Utah 1987).
Thus, by arguing alternative theories of recovery and by
failing to raise specific objections to proposed jury instructions, plaintiff has waived her right to assign as error the
giving of Instructions 16 and 19.

Jensen v. Eakins, 575 P.2d 179

(Utah 1978) .
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's summary disposition of
plaintiff's first appeal did not preclude an attempt to recover
on the basis of ordinary negligence; it merely stated that there
were outstanding questions of fact and that the question of the
application of res ipsa loquitur should be resolved by a jury.
Plaintiff made no attempt to amend her Complaint and no pretrial
order clarified her claim against defendants.

Conversely, until

closing argument, plaintiff stated that she was proceeding
against the doctor on both theories, and against the hospital on
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only one theory, that of res ipsa loquitur.
instructions to the contrary.

There were no

The jury, unanimously, failed to

find liability on the part of either defendant.
The instructions given were not inaccurate.
misstated current Utah law.

No instruction

The case law relied on by appellant,

Knapstead v. Smith Management Corp., 774 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1989)
dealt with a misstatement of Utah law; therefore, an erroneous
instruction was given regarding the applicable standard of care
and the court found the jury was mislead.

Such is not the case

before this court as none of the instructions were erroneous nor
misleading and each reflected applicable Utah law.
III.

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S

FINDING OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION.
Plaintiff has failed to marshall any evidence that the jury
verdict was unsupported.

Plaintiff admitted that she had

received no dental care for the first two decades of her life
and, as a consequence, her teeth were in horrible condition.
had undergone substantial bridge work and repair.

She

There was some

evidence that her teeth were not in optimal condition at the time
she was seen for surgery at Pioneer Valley Hospital.
Transcript at pp. 123-130.)

(Trial

A plausible explanation for the

damage to plaintiff's teeth was never developed by any party.
Given the state of plaintifffs dental work and the question
regarding instrumentality, the jury verdict may well have been
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supported by as simple a concept as unavoidable accident.

It is

critical to note that there is absolutely no evidence in the
record that the jury was confused, prejudiced or misled.
CONCLUSION
Jury Instructions 16 and 19 applied only to defendant Dr.
Dickson and not to defendant Pioneer Valley Hospital.

There is

no evidence to attack the propriety of the unanimous verdict in
favor of defendant Pioneer Valley Hospital.

In fact, by pleading

and then proceeding on alternative theories of recovery against
the defendants, it was necessary that the jury be instructed on
two theories of recovery, ordinary negligence or res ipsa
loquitur.

These alternative theories were explained to the jury;

however, the jury failed to find persuasive plaintiff's evidence
with regard to either theory.

Such a verdict should be affirmed

as it was well founded and there is no evidence that the jury
received erroneous instructions on the law.
DATED this (hw\

day of

(wA^Vl^f

, 1990.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
Elizabeth King
Attorneys for Defendant
Pioneer Valley Hospital
EKB464
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STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
September 16, 1988
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Daniel Darger, Esq.
100 Commercial Club Building
-32" Exch'ange PlaceSalt Lake £ity, Utah 84111

Lynn Nielsen,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
No. 880170
Pioneer Valley Hospital,
D.M. Dickson, George D. Veasy
and Does I Through V, inclusive,
Defendants and Appellee.

Appellant's motion for summary disposition of this matter
is hereby granted. The trial court was manifestly in error in
granting summary judgment since material facts are in dispute.
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980) is controlling
on the issue of res ipsa loquitur. Expert evidence is not
necessary to establish the applicable standard of care in this
case, as it appears no medical technicalities are involved.
The summary judgment is reversed and this case is remanded
for further proceedings.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

APPENDIX

,f M

A

INSTRUCTION NO.

/ /

It is undisputed in this case that the physician
defendant is an independent contractor, and that Pioneer
Valley Hospital is not responsible for the negligent acts,
if any, of such independent contractor.

Similarly, the

defendant physician is not responsible for the negligent
acts, if any, of Pioneer Valley Hospital or its nurses or
employees.

While there are multiple defendants in this

action, it does not follow from the fact alone that if one
is liable, all are liable. Each defendant is entitled to
a fair and independent consideration of his or her own
defense, and is not to be prejudiced by the fact, if such
become a fact, that you find that one of the other
defendants was negligent.

The instructions given you

govern the case as to each defendant, to the same effect
as if he were the only defendant in the action.

APPENDIX "B

INSTRUCTION NO.

/J

_

It is the duty of a hospital toward a person received as a
patient to use reasonable care-

A hospital is not required to

guarantee that the treatment received by a patient while in the
hospital will not injure or damage the patient. Rather, the
hospital is only required to employ the care and skill required
of hospitals under similar circumstances. Failure to use such
care and skill constitutes negligence.

INSTRUCTION NO

. xl

The lav recognizes unavoidable accidents. An
unavoidable accident is one which occurs in such a manner
that it cannot justly be said to have been proximately
caused by negligence as those terms are herein defined.

In

the event a party is damaged by an unavoidable accident, he
has no right to recover, since the law requires that a
person be injured by the fault or negligence of another as
a prerequisite to amy right to recover damages.

INSTRUCTION NO.

*

^

The Court instructs you that in certain situations
it is not necessary for the plaintiff in a medical
malpractice action to present evidence of the defendants'
negligence by expert testimony.

Specifically, where the

propriety of the treatment received is within the common
knowledge and experience of the layman, expert testimony
is unnecessary to establish the standard of care owed to
the plaintiff.

The plaintiff roust, however, establish

by the evidence that:
1.

The accident was of a kind which, in the

ordinary course of events, would not have happened had
the defendant (s) used due care;
2.

The instrument or thing causing the injury

was at the tine of the accident under the management and
control of the defendant(s); and
3.

The accident happened irrespective of any

participation at the time by the plaintiff.
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that
all three of the above criteria have been met, then you
may find an inference of negligence from those circumstances.
This does not mean that negligence is necessarily established,
it merely creates an inference which may be rebutted by the
defendant or defendants.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
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Daniel Darger, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
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32 Exchange Place
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By
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Attorneys for Defendant
Pioneer Valley Hospital
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